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 An inherently safer design plant is one that avoids hazards instead of 
controlling them, particularly by reducing the amount of hazardous material and the 
number of hazardous operations in the plant. Since years before, plenty of researchers 
have developed methodologies and studies to enhance the implementation of inherent 
safety concept in the industry. Inherent safe is best when applied towards the 
preliminary stage of the design rather than towards the end, due to its ability to reduce 
the cost of the overall plant design. In conceptual design, process routes and streams 
can be compared and ranked by using inherent safety indices. Many indices has been 
developed but unable to cover all parameters of the inherent safety. This paper will 
focus on producing an index and implemented to evaluate the streams that are highly 
susceptible to loss of containment in the form of toxic release. A case study on Acrylic 
Acid production plant will then be used to evaluate the usage of the index developed 
by using the Toxic Release Stream Index (TRSI). The results presented towards the 
end of this work proves that the index produced may be able to point out the inherently 
unsafe streams and modify the design up to be acceptable level during the preliminary 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Background  
 
Safety takes up a very crucial part of designing a process plant. Without proper 
focus on safety, major disasters due to chemical toxic release and explosions might 
happen, such as the Bhopal (1984) and Seveso (1976) disaster. In a typical process of 
designing any process plant, the safety approach usually is considered at the near end 
of the whole process. This leaves little to no space for safety issues to be avoided thus 
making the add-on enhancements the only option to reduce the hazard. Regular 
preventive maintenance plans are also added to the newly designed plant to reduce the 
risk of serious chemical accidents (Leong & Shariff, 2009). Control measures added 
late in design require continual staffing and maintenance throughout the life of the 
plant, greatly adding to the lifetime costs as well as repetitive training and 
documentation upkeep (Khan & Amyotte, 2002).  
 
As said by Crowl and Louvar in 2002, a major accident is defined as “an 
unexpected, sudden occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting 
from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment 
and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the environment, immediate or 
delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving more dangerous 
substance”. Since the last few years, many new safety procedures introduced to 
evaluate hazards. However, accidents keep on happening because the available 
solutions do not minimize or eliminate them (Kletz, 1991). 
 
The Seveso accident was a perfect example of a major accident regarding the 
release of toxic substances. The accident which happened in the year 1976 was a result 
of a failure in the overall reaction and causing the release of 6 tonnes of chemicals 
over an 18 kilometre squared area. Among the chemicals released was 1 kg of 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD). High amount of TCDD resulted in few adverse 
effect ascertained such as chloracne (193 cases), peripheral neuropathy and liver 




 These accidents highlight the importance of safety as a step to prevent 
catastrophic events from happening. In addition to that, a lot of researches are trying 
to implement safety in the preliminary stage of the designing process so that the hazard 
can be reduced or eliminated thoroughly.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
Currently, the methods that are actively in used during the designing of any 
process plants are the ones that have been in used for a long time. The methods include 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), DOW Fire and Explosion Index (DOW 
FEI), Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), et cetera. These methods involve doing 
hazard identification and also risk assessment and usually it is done towards the end 
of the design process. The alternative to this approach is to implement the inherent 
safety concept. This concept has been around for several years but it hasn’t been 
widely used in the industry. In this approach, less reliance is placed on ‘add-on’ 
engineered safety systems and features, and procedural controls which can and do fail 
(Khan & Amyotte, 2005). 
 
Many previous studies on inherent safety level (ISL) quantification index 
based are focusing on processing route. However, most of the work for index based 
inherent safety design (ISD) approach focusing on chemical route by using properties 
of single component. These indices lack of considering the chemical component as a 
mixture and developed purposely for toxic release.  
 
 Using a concept called Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI), the safest route can 
be obtained in a process design. After determining the safest route, the ISD can be 
applied at this stage by improving the inherent safety level of the streams. Further 
improvement can be done to ensure the ISD by ranking the process streams based on 
ISL within a process route. The selection of most hazardous streams can be done if the 
ISL of the process streams can be ranked through the technique such as the index based 




1.3 Objectives and Scope of Study  
 
The objectives of the project are: 
 
1) To develop a new method of calculating the Toxic Release Stream Index based 
on the inherent safety concept 
2) To implement the Toxic Release Stream Index to a case study to demonstrate 
its application in the industry 
3) To compare the accuracy of results of toxic release between this paper and the 
previous researches  
 
The scope of study includes: 
 
1) Understanding the concept of inherent safety and its current application in the 
industry  
2) Understanding the TRRI concept which gives a bigger picture in the TRSI 
3) Using HYSYS to simulate the process stream in the process plant 
 
The student is expected to understand the concept of inherent safety and the 
methodologies done by previous researches. Based on the recent studies, the student 
is expected to come up with an index which explains the possible toxic release of the 
streams in a process plant. This project aims to reduce the possibility of toxic release 












CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Inherent Safety 
 
 The inherent safety concept was first introduced by Trevor Kletz in his 1978 
article entitled What You Don't Have, Can't Leak. The principles defining inherent 
safety as shown in Table 1 were formalized by Kletz (1991). Inherent safety focuses 
on avoiding hazards instead of controlling them, specifically by reducing the amount 
of hazardous material and the number of hazardous operations in the plant. 
 
Table 1: Principles of inherent safety 
Principles Definition 
Intensification Reduction of the inventories of hazardous materials 
Substitution Change of hazardous chemicals substances by less hazardous 
chemicals 
Attenuation Reduction of the volumes of hazardous materials required in the 
process. Reduction of operation hazards by changing the 
processing conditions to lower temperatures, pressures or flows 
Limitation of 
effects 
The facilities must be designed in order to minimize effects of 
hazardous chemicals or energies releases 
Simplification Avoidance of complexities such as multi-product or multi-unit 
operations, or congested pipe or unit settings 
Error tolerance Making equipment robust, processes that can bear upsets, 
reactors able to withstand unwanted reactions, etc. 
 
In any safety approach, the main aim is to minimize the total risk posed by a 
certain process plant. The risk is a product of the probability of an incident happening 
and the possible impact due to the incident actually happening. This is where inherent 
safety takes effect. Applying the principles to the inherent safety strategies themselves 
is obviously the most effective and straightforward approach, and has received the 
majority of attention in prior development of assessment tools (Heikkilä, 1999). 
However, the principles can also be applied at the other levels of the hierarchy, for 
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example leading to add-on measures that are more reliable, effective and thus making 
it inherently safer (Tugnoli, Khan, Amyotte, & Cozzani, 2008).  
 
It is said that the possibility of implementing inherent safety decreases as the 
design proceeds (Rahman, Heikkilä, & Hurme, 2005) thus it is best to apply the IS 
concept in the preliminary design of the process plant. Based on the general principles 
in Table 1, a logical hierarchy of them are presented in Figure 1 below (Khan & 
Amyotte, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of the IS general principles 
 
For example, the elimination or reduction in size of equipment can lead to the 
use of simpler, smaller, more compact equipment which offers the promise of reduced 
hazard and risks, reduced weight and space requirements, and less maintenance. In this 
way inherent safety approaches can provide the most cost-effective route to safety 
(Khan & Amyotte, 2002).  
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2.2 Previous Methodologies for Quantification on Inherent Safety 
Level 
 
The evaluation methods of process safety have started from plenty of years 
back. Some of the methodologies were useful, but tedious to be implemented. 
Although the option of inherently safer design is economically viable, many 
researchers such as Kletz (1991), Moore et al., 2007 and Mansfield et al., 1966, 
Rushton et al. (1994), Moore (2007) had identified the lack of proper tool and system 
for its implementation as a key factor to poor application in the industry. Other than 
that, there is also a general lack of familiarity of the specific advantages of adopting 
an inherently safer approach to process design (Shariff, Leong, & Zaini, 2012). The 
other reasons for the lack of implementation of inherent safety are pictured in the 
figure 2 below (Kletz, 1991). 
 
 
Figure 2: Problems of implementing inherent safety 
 
In order to overcome the problems which was stated above, few researchers 
have proposed some methodologies for the assessment of the inherent safety level 
(ISL). One of the earliest methods proposed is the inherent safety checklist developed 
by Bollinger et al. (1996) and CCPS (1996). They provide extensive questions related 
to inherent safety and also provide guidance to implement inherent safety in process 
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design (Rusli & Mohd Shariff, 2010). The first published work was by Edwards and 
Lawrence in 1993 entitled “Prototype Index for Inherent Safety (PIIS)”. Basically, the 
indices for ranking alternatives chemical routes by Lawrence incorporated seven 
parameters relates to the physical properties of the chemicals and conditions of 
reaction steps which are, the temperature, pressure, reaction yield, inventory, toxicity, 
explosiveness and flammability. A trial inherent safety index has been developed for 
ranking alternative chemical routes by inherent safety. This index is later on 
implemented in a number of routes in produce methyl methacrylate (MMA). To verify 
and improve the index, a group of experts were asked to rank the routes and give 
comments on the new index developed. When compared, the new index matched with 
the experts ranking of the routes in the index. A new index has been created and from 
there, the process of improving the index will be repeated. 
 
Next is the proposed Inherent Safety Index (ISI) methodology by Heikkila in 
1999. Basically it is also an index developed to implement inherent safety in the early 
phases of design. The total index is divided into Chemical and Process Inherent Safety 
Index. The chemical inherent safety index is formed of sub-indices for reaction heats, 
flammability, explosiveness, toxicity, corrosiveness and chemical interaction. The 
process inherent safety index is formed of sub-indices for inventory, process 
temperature, pressure and the safety of equipment and process structure. When 
compared, Heikkila adapted a lot more parameters than Lawrence and Edwards but 
both still included toxic release as one of the parameters studied. The table below 
shows the summary of the parameters used by the two researchers. 
 
Table 2: Parameters of inherent safety 
 Edwards and Lawrence, 
(1993) 
Heikkila (1999) 
Inventory x x 
Temperature x x 
Pressure x x 
Heat of main reaction x x 
Heat of side reaction - x 
Flammability x x 
Explosiveness x x 
Corrosiveness - x 
8 
 
Toxicity x x 
Chemical interaction - x 
Type of equipment - x 
Safety of process structure - x 
 
 
The following researchers focused to improve the indices such as i-Safe by 
Palaniappan (2002) while Gupta and Edwards (2003) developed a graphical method 
to measure ISL. Most of the ISL assessment methodologies that are proposed currently 
are focused on the indexing technique for process route evaluation. Khan and Amyotte 
(2005) proposed a method based on the word guide from HAZOP studies known as 
“integrated inherent safety index” (I2SI). The developed index was intended to be 
applied throughout the life cycle of process design.  
 
 The indices that are presently available mostly deal with a lot of data and it 
requires a tedious way of data transfer of process information and parameters for the 
inherent safety level calculation. This is then adapted by Mohd Shariff et al. (2006) to 
propose an integration of the process design simulator, HYSYS with the inherent 
safety index calculation by using the integrated risk estimation tool (iRET). The same 
concept was also picked up by Leong and Shariff (2008) in developing the inherent 
safety index module (ISIM) which integrates Microsoft Excel with HYSYS for 
simplicity of data transfer.  
 
This paper aims to propose a new way of measuring the inherent safety level 
in process routes based on the toxic level of the stream. This concept is adapted from 
previous study on Process Stream Index (PSI) for explosiveness as a parameter done 
by Shariff, Leong and Zaini in 2012. 
 
2.3 Toxic Release as Inherent Safety Parameter 
 
2.3.1 Toxic Release Consequence Analysis Tool (TORCAT)  
  
In a recent paper done by Mohd Shariff and Zaini in 2010, they developed a tool to 
properly analyse the inherent safety in plants, specifically on toxic release. This Toxic 
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Release Consequence Analysis Tool (TORCAT) framework allows them to detect 
which streams has the highest toxicity level evaluate them to ensure less to no harm 
will be done. This tool has an advantage from the others aforementioned in the sense 
that it directly links the software that is being used to simulate the process, iCON to 
an excel sheet where the results are displayed. The assessment tool was designed in a 
way that it could generate the outputs in the form of concentration level of toxic release 
and toxic effect from the source of release. This is as important as determining which 
stream that has the highest potential of toxic release as it is one of the mitigation tool 
used in the preliminary design stage. The framework for TORCAT is shown in the 
Figure 3 below.  
 
 
Figure 3: Framework for TORCAT 
 
2.3.2 2-region Risk Matrix 
 
In addition to that, in another paper done by Mohd Shariff and Zaini in 2013 also 
implement another method to assess the toxic release as inherent safety parameter. In 
this paper, they introduced a risk assessment concept to implement the inherent safety 
at the preliminary stage of the design. Their assessment is based on a 2-region matrix, 
which is also adapted from a previous study on explosion which reduce the risk to As 
Low as Reasonably Practical (ALARP). The design matrix is divided into 2 parts, 
acceptable and unacceptable. If the design condition falls into the unacceptable region, 
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the design can be improved by implementing the inherent safety principle to shift it 
towards the acceptable region. This approach aims to evaluate the risk of the process 
design thoroughly and also to identify the possible solution to eliminate or reduce the 
hazards, thus producing an inherently safer process design during the preliminary stage 
(Shariff & Zaini, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4: 2-region risk matrix 
 
2.3.3 Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI) 
 
In a previous study done by Asari in 2014 shows that the toxic release route index 
(TRRI) is more inclined towards identifying the specific routes that is safest in a 
certain process. It is clear that there would be more than one route in a certain process 
and the index proves that it is valid by comparing it with several of the previous 
methodologies’ results as well. The results from the study is shown in the table below. 
By knowing the route, the process designers can pay more attention to the safest route 
and apply the index that will be developed further in this paper that can identify 
streams with higher susceptibility to loss of containment. This concept is adapted from 
Process Route Index (PRI) done by Shariff and Leong which identifies the safest 




Table 3: Ranking of MMA process by various indices 
Methyl Methacrylate Acid 








Shariff - PRI 
TRRI 
Ethylene via methyl propionate 
based route (C2/MP) 
3 3 2 4 4 
Ethylene via propionaldehyde 
based route (C2/PA) 
4 4 3 3 3 
Isobutylene based route (i-C4) 2 2 1 2 1 
Tertiary Butyl Alcohol based 
route (TBA) 
1 1 1 1 2 
 
 
These papers study the same parameter of inherent safety which is the toxic 
release but from different point of view. Each and every study will contribute to 
inherent safety being widely used in the industry thus making accidents linking to toxic 
release prone to happen less. This paper behaves as a mew method to determine which 
streams that need proper focus in case of a toxic release or loss of containment. The 
















CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY/PROJECT WORK 
 
3.1 Project Framework 
 
This project aims to develop a new concept to quantify risk, which is inherent to the 
process plant at preliminary design stage. It is carried out by using an inherent risk 
assessment which is integrated with process design simulator to allow data transfer. A 
case study will be used to illustrate the advantage of implementing this technique. This 




This is the first stage of the project. During this stage, the student will analyse 
the streams and characterize the streams according to its pressure, density and 
toxicity level. The data can be found based on several sources. The pressure 
and density of the chemicals can be obtained through simulation software 
called HYSYS. For the purpose of determining the effect of chemicals used, 
the National Fire and Protection Agency (NFPA) 704 ranking value is chosen. 
NFPA 704 is a standard that is used to identify the hazards associated with 
materials. The NFPA 704 sets a hazard value ranging from 0 to 4 based on the 
ability of the chemical to cause any health hazard. The table below shows the 
description that fits for the NFPA 704 hazard values. This standard is chosen 
because it provides a simple and easily understood system of markings that can 
give a general idea of the hazards of the material and the severity of these 
hazards as they relate to emergency response.  
 
This standard can be visually noticed by looking at the hazmat 
diamond. For each and every chemical, the diamond acts as a safety sign which 
shows user on the hazard of the chemical from the aspect of health hazard 





Figure 5: Example of a hazmat diamond 
 
Table 4: Standard System for the Identification of the Hazard Material for 




0 Poses no health hazard, no precautions necessary and would offer no hazard 
beyond that of ordinary combustible materials  
1 Exposure would cause irritation with only minor residual injury 
2 Intense or continued but not chronic exposure could cause temporary 
incapacitation or possible residual injury  
3 Short exposure could cause serious temporary or moderate residual injury  
4 Very short exposure could cause death or major residual injury  
 
Apart from using the NFPA standards, the Threshold Limit Values (TLV) 
could be another possible way to evaluate the toxicity level in a certain stream. 
This is due to its readily available data in most process industry. The standards 
on acceptable or tolerable risks are usually based on the risk statistics as well 
as the economy development level and the public value concept. Therefore the 
criteria are different from each other to some extent (Yu, Zhang, Wang, Ma, & 
Chen, 2009). For most chemicals, their respective TLVs can be located in the 
MSDS. TLV reflects a limit value of maximum exposure a worker can have 
without any adverse health effects. In this paper, the TLV for average exposure 
for a time of 8 hours per day is being used. It is important to use the same 
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threshold time for all TLV to ensure results are comparable. The table below 
shows the respective TLVs and its score. 
 
Table 5: TLV values and respective scores 
TLV range (ppm) Score 
TLV > 10000 0 
TLV < 10000 1 
TLV < 1000 2 
TLV < 100 3 
TLV < 10  4 
TLV < 1 5 
TLV < 0.1 6 
 
As the TLV value increases, the score decreases. This means that the lower the 




This is the second stage of the project. The TRSI developed will serve as a 
numerical guideline of the overall safety of the stream for a plant. This project 
will take the assumption that the sudden loss of containment will happen 
instantaneously, releasing a huge amount of gas at the point of rupture. By 









































 Eqn. 3.1 
Where 
 C  is the time average concentration of centre puff cloud (kg/m3) 
 
*
mQ  is the mass of material released (kg)  
 zyx   are the dispersion coefficient in terms of x, y and z direction 
(m) 
 x  is the downwind direction (m) 
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 y  is the crosswind direction (m) 
 z  is the distance above the ground (m) 
 t  is the time since puff cloud release (s) 
 
Based on the equation 3.1 above, the mass release is assumed to be an 
important parameter when dealing with toxic release. Apart from that, the 
toxicity level of the chemical at the point of release is equally important. The 
toxicity level of each stream is known during stage 1. The TRSI for each stream 
will be calculated by using the formula adapted from the PSI. This formula 
takes account the important variables that could affect the toxicity level of a 
certain stream. 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼 = 𝑓(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑇𝐿)   Eqn. 3.2 
 
In a process stream, the toxicity level depends on the each chemical component 
present and the effects of each chemical to the stream. The presence of a 
chemical component in the stream will affect the overall toxicity of the stream. 
The term mass in the equation 3.2 above can be further converted to basic 
parameters using basic fluid dynamics properties. As said by Asari, the amount 
of mass flowing through in case of rupture is a function of density and pressure 
differential between the system and surrounding as per given in equation 3.3 
below. The toxicity level is determined as the mass flow and the effect of the 
chemical NFPA 704 as described in Table 3.  
 
Toxicity level (TL) = f(mass flow avg, NFPA 704)  Eqn. 3.3 
 
The mass flow avg can be further explained by a combination of the mass 
flow with the mass fraction of the component in the stream.  
 
𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑇𝐿)   Eqn. 3.4 
 
TRSI has a dimensionless unit, whereas the pressure and density have the unit 
of bar and kg/m3 respectively. The TRSI is then further evaluated by taking 
16 
 
the parameters individually and validating it against the average pressure, 
density and TL for each stream. This will give a suitable results that matches 
the overall toxicity of the plant.  
 
𝐼𝑝 =
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
   Eqn 3.5 
 
𝐼𝜌 =
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
      Eqn. 3.6 
 
𝐼𝑇𝐿 =
𝑇𝐿 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝐿 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
     Eqn. 3.7 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼 = 𝐴𝑜 (𝐼𝑝 𝑥 𝐼𝑑  𝑥 𝐼𝑇𝐿)    Eqn. 3.8 
 
Most of the indices developments are based on arbitrary decision. There is no 
single method to perform the indices exercise and the analyst can choose to 
develop their own numerical indices customized to their needs. For example 
the calculation of the Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) from Dow Chemical 
Company is a value of dimensionless arbitrarily defined numerical scale even 
though the parameters that contribute to the CEI are consisted unit 
measurements (CCPS, 1996). By following this previous indices experience, 
the TRSI is an arbitrarily average parameters combination calculations that 
influences the toxic release which is also dimensionless in value. Since the 
TRSI is to represent the overall process route index, the average value of 
parameters in equation 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 are selected which results in equation 
3.8. The empirical constant Ao is used to increase or decrease the magnitude 
of the resulting numbers for the calculation of TRSI. The value of Ao are 




This is the third stage. After the TRSI have been calculated, the values of each 
stream will be populated into a table and the higher the value of TRSI, the 
higher chance it has to a loss of containment. This concept provides a single 
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numerical value to represent the overall inherent safety level in a process 
stream. The ranking of the TRSI is mainly to alert the process designers to see 
which streams are more prone to danger and thus may opt to apply the inherent 
safety concept here by reducing the amount of hazardous materials used.  
 
The results will then be compared to the previous study done by Shariff, Leong 
and Zaini in 2012 entitled Process Stream Index. This is done as a validation 
that the two parameters give results coherent with each other. To increase the 
strength of this validation, a correlation coefficient between the two parameters 







   Eqn 3.9 
 
The quantity r, called the linear correlation coefficient, measures the strength 















































Figure 6: Flowchart of the proposed project
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within limits? 
Identify the process streams 
Start 
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Calculation of toxicity level (TL) 
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3.2 Gantt Chart 
 
3.2.1 FYP I Timeline 
 
Table 6: FYP I Gantt Chart 
NO Description\Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Selection of Project Title               
2 Preliminary Research Work and 
Literature Review 
              
3 Submission of Extended 
Proposal 
              
4 Preparation for Proposal Defence               
5 Proposal Defence Presentation               
6 Continuation of Project Work               
7 Preparation of Interim Report               
8 Submission of Draft Interim 
Report 
              
9 Submission of Interim Final 
Report 





3.2.2 FYP II Timeline 
Table 7: FYP II Gantt Chart 
NO Description\Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Identify case study               
2 Identify streams and chemicals used               
3 Calculation of toxicity level               
4 Calculation of TRSI               
5 Rank the streams according to TRSI 
and analyze 
              
6 Submission of progress report               
7 Preparation of poster and report               
8 Pre-SEDEX               
9 Submission of draft technical paper and 
dissertation 
              
10 Submission of technical paper               
11 Oral Presentation               




3.3 Case Study  
 
To ensure the accuracy of the results, the TRSI will be studied using a readily 
available plant that can be improved using this index. The case study will be used to 
illustrate on how to prioritize streams according to its toxicity level. It is also 
demonstrated with the emphasis on application of inherent safety concept to eliminate 
or improve the consequence due to toxic release. The previous study on Toxic Release 
Route Index have been implemented to 4 different process routes to produce methyl 
methacrylate (MMA). This is due to the availability of previous methodologies done 
by Lawrence (2006) and Palaniappan (2002) thus making it easier to compare the 
accuracy of the results. For TRSI, the index will be implemented to an Acrylic Acid 
production plant developed by a previous study by Soo in 2004. The Figure 7 below 
will act as a base case for the case study. There are a total of 28 streams in the plant 
and TRSI will take account each streams as its own. The calculations and the index 




















CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
As mentioned above, the 3 parameters that are needed to calculate the TRSI are the 
pressure, density and the toxicity level of the streams (TL). These values can be 
obtained from the simulation of Acrylic Acid production via propylene oxidation. To 
compare between the parameters, each value will then be divided with the average 
value of the parameter for a given route. These are later than compiled and multiplied 
to calculate TRSI.  
 
4.1 TRSI Results 
 








































































By applying equation 3.4, a value of 1.9096 is obtained as the average pressure. 
The 𝐼𝑝 for stream 1 is 1.30919. This shows that stream 1 has 30.9% more pressure 
compared to the average pressure of all streams. When the 𝐼𝑝 for all the streams are 
calculated and sorted from highest value to the lowest, it can be observed in Table 9 
that stream 2 is relatively the highest in the rank of pressure. No initial evaluation can 
be made with only one parameter calculated thus it is also done for the other two 
parameters, namely density and TL. The calculation for the TL for each streams are as 
follows. 
Table 10: TL calculation for 28 streams in Acrylic Acid Plant 


















0.000 3 0.000 
4.40 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.052 2 0.126 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.948 1 1.142 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 1.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
        1.268       0.000 
         


















0.000 3 0.000 
9.10 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.767 0 0.000 0.767 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.233 3 6.356 0.233 3 6.356 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 






















0.000 3 0.000 
5.59 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.052 2 0.126 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.948 1 1.142 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.767 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.233 3 3.907 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
        1.268       3.907 
         


















0.000 3 0.000 
11.19 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.006 2 0.126 0.006 2 0.126 
Propene 0.102 1 1.142 0.102 1 1.142 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.383 0 0.000 0.383 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.116 3 3.907 0.116 3 3.907 
H2O 0.393 0 0.000 0.393 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 































0.000 3 0.000 
11.19 
0.012 3 0.396 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.006 2 0.126 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.003 1 0.034 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.010 3 0.341 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.119 4 5.323 
Nitrogen 0.767 0 0.000 0.383 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.233 3 2.450 0.029 3 0.969 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 0.439 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
        2.450       7.189 
         


















0.044 3 0.000 
14.70 
0.009 3 0.396 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.004 2 0.126 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.002 1 0.034 
Acrylic Acid 0.006 3 0.000 0.008 3 0.341 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.023 4 0.000 0.091 4 5.323 
Nitrogen 0.091 0 0.000 0.475 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.005 3 0.000 0.078 3 3.418 
H2O 0.832 0 0.000 0.334 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 































0.009 3 0.396 
14.70 
0.013 3 0.553 
Propane 0.004 2 0.126 0.004 2 0.126 
Propene 0.002 1 0.034 0.002 1 0.034 
Acrylic Acid 0.008 3 0.341 0.119 3 5.268 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.002 3 0.086 
Acrolein 0.091 4 5.323 0.001 4 0.053 
Nitrogen 0.475 0 0.000 0.475 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.078 3 3.418 0.049 3 2.176 
H2O 0.334 0 0.000 0.335 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
        9.639       8.296 
         


















0.008 3 0.000 
14.70 
0.013 3 0.553 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.004 2 0.126 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.002 1 0.034 
Acrylic Acid 0.337 3 0.000 0.119 3 5.268 
Acetic Acid 0.006 3 0.000 0.002 3 0.086 
Acrolein 0.001 4 0.000 0.001 4 0.053 
Nitrogen 0.009 0 0.000 0.475 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.001 3 0.000 0.049 3 2.176 
H2O 0.639 0 0.000 0.335 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 































0.020 3 0.551 
5.61 
0.000 3 0.002 
Propane 0.007 2 0.126 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.004 1 0.034 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.011 3 0.312 0.295 3 4.955 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.013 0.004 3 0.073 
Acrolein 0.001 4 0.038 0.001 4 0.016 
Nitrogen 0.767 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.080 3 2.176 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.109 0 0.000 0.700 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
        3.249       5.047 
         


















0.000 3 0.000 
8.98 
0.020 3 0.551 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.007 2 0.126 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.004 1 0.034 
Acrylic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.001 3 0.015 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.002 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.001 4 0.036 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.777 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.081 3 2.176 
H2O 1.000 0 0.000 0.110 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 































0.000 3 0.000 
0.01 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.085 3 0.297 0.000 3 0.000 
Acetic Acid 0.003 3 0.011 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.001 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.911 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 1.000 2 0.015 
        0.309       0.015 
         


















0.000 3 0.002 
5.02 
0.000 3 0.002 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.258 3 5.253 0.001 3 0.011 
Acetic Acid 0.004 3 0.084 0.006 3 0.084 
Acrolein 0.001 4 0.017 0.001 4 0.017 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.736 0 0.000 0.993 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.001 2 0.015 0.000 2 0.000 































0.000 3 0.000 
1.76 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 0.995 3 5.242 0.995 3 5.242 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.004 2 0.015 0.004 2 0.015 
        5.257       5.257 
         


















0.000 3 0.000 
0.02 
0.000 3 0.000 
Propane 0.000 2 0.000 0.000 2 0.000 
Propene 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1 0.000 
Acrylic Acid 1.000 3 5.213 0.556 3 0.029 
Acetic Acid 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
Acrolein 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 
Nitrogen 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Oxygen 0.000 3 0.000 0.000 3 0.000 
H2O 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 
Hydroquinone 0.000 2 0.000 0.444 2 0.015 












Following the calculation of the TL, the 𝑰𝑻𝑳 for each stream is then calculated using 
equation 3.6.  A value of 3.8510 is obtained as the average TL. The 𝑰𝑻𝑳 for stream 1 
is 1.2677. This shows that stream 1 has 26.7% more TL value compared to the average 
pressure of all streams. The tabulated 𝑰𝑻𝑳 is shown in table below.  
 


































The result is a relative ranking of all the stream within all the streams in a 
process route portrayed in Table 12 below, as explained in section 3.1, (2). The 
resulting dimensionless numbers can be used to clearly differentiate the streams when 
considering the parameters individually. The primary function of these numbers is to 
give an index that reflects the severity of the process stream in a case of toxic release 
or loss of containment. It is to be noted that the higher the value of TRSI, the less 
inherently safe the plant is. By using this index, it is possible to identify and eliminate 
the most inherently unsafe at the preliminary design stage of the process plant. It can 
also help to eliminate other streams will zero value as the streams will not cause any 











Table 12: Relative Ranking of TRSI for 28 streams 
Stream 𝑰𝑷 𝑰𝝆 𝑰𝑻𝑳 TRSI 
18 1.04736 2.4125 1.3105 49.67 
23 0.68078 2.3748 1.3948 33.82 
26 0.26184 2.4780 1.3651 13.29 
27 0.04713 2.4330 1.3537 2.33 
21 0.68078 2.4177 0.0803 1.98 
25 0.02252 2.4780 1.3651 1.14 
16 1.30919 0.0095 2.1542 0.40 
13 1.30919 0.0035 2.5029 0.17 
4 1.30919 0.0051 1.6505 0.16 
14 1.30919 0.0038 2.1542 0.16 
12 1.30919 0.0033 2.5029 0.16 
22 1.04736 2.4160 0.0040 0.15 
10 1.30919 0.0030 1.8669 0.11 
7 1.30919 0.0041 1.3436 0.11 
6 1.30919 0.0051 1.0145 0.10 
1 1.30919 0.0127 0.3292 0.08 
8 1.30919 0.0030 1.3436 0.08 
9 1.30919 0.0051 0.6361 0.06 
5 1.30919 0.0094 0.3292 0.06 
17 1.04736 0.0036 0.8437 0.05 
3 0.52368 0.0028 1.6505 0.04 
28 0.05760 2.3731 0.0114 0.02 
20 0.57605 0.0027 0.7633 0.02 
24 0.01309 0.0000 0.0297 0.00 
2 2.61839 0.0057 0.0000 0.00 
11 1.30919 2.6853 0.0000 0.00 
15 1.30919 3.3640 0.0000 0.00 
19 1.04736 2.4854 0.0000 0.00 
 
 
Based on Table 12, streams 18, 23 and 26 shows the highest values as opposed to 
streams 24, 2, 11, 15 and 19 which shows 0. When analysing the chance of toxic 
release in the plant, streams with zero value can be eliminated completely white the 






4.2 Comparison of TRSI with Process Stream Index (PSI)  
 
 The Acrylic Acid production plant HYSYS simulation (Soo, 2008) has been 
tested by two different indexes, one done by Shariff et all. (2012) and the other one in 
this project. Both study uses similar methodology to calculate the index in which both 
of them takes the ratio of a particular parameter for the selected stream against the 
average value of the parameters that are involved. The results from this two study are 
presented in Table 13, in which the PSI results are in the middle column and TRSI in 
the most left column. It can be concluded from the results that both of the index show 
stream 18 being the most inherently unsafe by having the highest score among 28 
streams calculated from the perspective of explosiveness (PSI) and toxic release 
(TRSI). Thus, both the PSI and TRSI are examples of indexes that are developed to 
reflect the degree of hazard that is inherent to the design and have the ability to account 
for the properties inside the mixture instead of as an individual component to quantify 
the inherent safety level (ISL). 
 
 To check that both of the index are linear with each other, the data set from the 
Table 12 can be numerically represented by a correlation coefficient. The formula is 
given in Section 3.1 (3) above. The correlation coefficient measures the strength and 
direction of a linear relationship between the two sets of data. The correlation 
coefficient for this study is calculated both manually and by using PEARSON function 














Table 13: Inherent safety indices for Acrylic Acid production plant streams 
 Process stream 
Index (PSI) 








Calculated value Calculate value 
1 0.11 0.08 
2 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.04 
4 0.08 0.16 
5 0.00 0.06 
6 0.08 0.10 
7 0.05 0.11 
8 0.05 0.08 
9 0.00 0.06 
10 0.12 0.11 
11 0.00 0.00 
12 0.12 0.16 
13 0.13 0.17 
14 0.04 0.16 
15 0.00 0.00 
16 0.09 0.40 
17 0.00 0.05 
18 13.54 49.67 
19 0.00 0.00 
20 0.00 0.02 
21 0.00 1.98 
22 0.00 0.15 
23 12.52 33.82 
24 0.00 0.00 
25 0.10 1.14 
26 1.16 13.29 
27 0.20 2.33 








Based on the formula, the value of r can be -1 < r < +1. The + and – signs are used for 
positive linear correlations and negative linear correlations, respectively. The results 
of this coefficient can be divided into 4 groups namely: 
 
1) Positive correlation 
If x and y have a strong positive linear correlation, r is close to +1. An r value 
of exactly +1 indicates a perfect positive fit. Positive values indicate a directly 
proportional relationship between and y variables. It is such that if x increase, 
y will also increase.  
 
2) Negative correlation 
If x and y have a strong negative linear correlation, r is close to -1. An r value 
of exactly -1 indicates a perfect negative fit. Positive values indicate an 
inversely proportional relationship between and y variables. It is such that if x 
increase, y will decrease.  
 
3) No correlation 
If there is no linear correlation or a weak linear correlation, r is close to zero. 
A value near zero means that there is a random nonlinear relationship between 
the variable x and y. Note that r is a dimensionless quantity, thus it does not 
depend on the units involved.  
 
4) A perfect correlation 
This is a special case where it only occurs if all of the data points lie exactly 
on a straight line. If r = +1, the slope of this line is positive. If r = -1, the slope 
of this line is negative.  
 
A correlation with coefficient that is greater than 0.8 is generally described as strong, 
while a correlation less than 0.5 is generally described as weak. The calculation is laid 








Table 14: Correlation Coefficient between TRSI and PSI 
 STREAM TRSI (x) PSI (y) n x 𝒙𝟐 y 𝒚𝟐 xy 
1 18 49.7 13.5 1 49.7 2467.1 13.5 182.3 670.5 
2 23 33.8 12.4 2 33.8 1144.1 12.4 153.8 419.4 
3 26 13.3 1.2 3 13.3 176.5 1.2 1.4 15.9 
4 27 2.3 0.2 4 2.3 5.4 0.2 0.0 0.5 
5 21 2.0 0 5 2.0 3.9 0 0.0 0.0 
6 25 1.1 0.1 6 1.1 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 
7 16 0.4 0.1 7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
8 13 0.2 0 8 0.2 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
9 4 0.2 0 9 0.2 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
10 14 0.2 0.2 10 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
11 12 0.2 0.1 11 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
12 22 0.2 0.1 12 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
13 10 0.1 0.1 13 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
14 7 0.1 0.1 14 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
15 6 0.1 0.1 15 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
16 1 0.1 0.5 16 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 
17 8 0.1 0.1 17 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
18 9 0.1 0 18 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
19 5 0.1 0 19 0.1 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
20 17 0.0 0 20 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
21 3 0.0 0 21 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
22 28 0.0 0 22 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
23 20 0.0 0 23 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
24 24 0.0 0 24 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
25 2 0.0 0 25 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
26 11 0.0 0 26 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
27 15 0.0 0 27 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
28 19 0.0 0 28 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
     104.2 3798.8 28.8 337.9 1106.7 
 
n = 28 
Ʃx = 104.2 
Ʃy = 28.8 
Σ𝑥2= 3798.8 
Σ𝑦2= 337.9 
Ʃxy = 1106.7 
 
r = 0.97 
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4.3 Mitigation Action 
 
 To reduce the severity of the streams that has high values of TRSI, author has 
come up with a mitigation plan since the index is at the preliminary design stage. Some 
of the options considered are reducing the number of equipments used, reducing the 
amount of hazardous material used or changing the parameters used in the process 
stream. All of the options follow closely the criterias that was aligned by Kletz which 
are shown in Table 1. The user can also apply other methodologies such as TORCAT 
to calculate the significant difference by using probit analysis to determine the before 
and after consequences of the reduced value of TRSI. 
 
 The objective is to change the parameters without affecting the products at the 
end of the process stream. By altering the pressure, the amount of Acrylic Acid 
produced can still be maintained while the probability of streams 18, 23 and 26 to have 
a toxic release are decreased. By reducing the pressures of entering components in 
Streams 1 and 2 by half, it can make a huge difference in the TRSI value of process. 
The table below shows the altered values of pressure for the process.


































These changed values of pressure will result in a change of TRSI values of: 
Stream 18: 49.67 to 42.59 
Stream 23:33.82 to 29.75 
Stream 26:13.29 to 3.04 
The changes in pressure can contribute to reduce of up to 23% in the TRSI value. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
As a conclusion, Inherent Safety Level quantification remains as one of the 
important factor in the challenge for inherent safety concept to gain industry 
acceptance. Few pioneering indices to quantify inherent safety have been proposed in 
the past. These indices though are moderately simple to use, still have many rooms for 
improvement in order to represent the process stream condition more accurately. An 
inherent safety option may not always be the best option due to the possibility that it 
might be costly or not feasible within the project timetable compared to trusted add-
ons measures. Rather, the aim of inherent safety is to encourage designers to integrate 
safety with design and to tackle safety issues at the earliest stage possible. This paper 
will allow the designers to focus on the specific streams to prevent any toxic release 
leading to any catastrophic event from happening. It demonstrated the importance to 
have a quantitative method to measure the toxicity level of each stream in a process 
plant.  
The case study which implemented the index at a preliminary stage proves to 
be an effective test as it produces a satisfactory result for this level. The index’s validity 
enhances as the TRSI produced are parallel to the PSI on the streams that are the most 
inherently unsafe. A method have been introduced to reduce the value of TRSI in order 
to reduce the hazard up to 23%. It is believed that there are potential for future work 
in expanding this project by introducing other parameters to further enhance the 
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